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Abstract. Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We reg-
ularly observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life and in controlled experiments
with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they
should deviate from the collective interest and act so as to maximise their own in-
dividual payoff. However, there is typically heterogeneity across subjects: some may
cooperate, while others may not. Since individual factors promoting cooperation could
be used by institutions to indirectly prime cooperation, this heterogeneity raises the
important question of who these cooperators are. We have conducted a series of ex-
periments to study whether benevolence, defined as a unilateral act of paying a cost
to increase the welfare of someone else beyond one’s own, is related to cooperation in
a subsequent one-shot anonymous Prisoner’s dilemma. Contrary to the predictions of
the widely used inequity aversion models, we find that benevolence does exist and a
large majority of people behave this way. We also find benevolence to be correlated
with cooperative behaviour. Finally, we show a causal link between benevolence and
cooperation: priming people to think positively about benevolent behaviour makes
them significantly more cooperative than priming them to think malevolently. Thus
benevolent people exist and cooperate more.
Introduction
Two or more people cooperate if they pay an individual cost in order to increase the
welfare of the group. The canonical economic model, assuming people care only about
their own welfare, predicts that they should not cooperate: the incentive to minimise
individual cost causes people to act selfishly. In reality the opposite behaviour is often
observed. In personal relationships, workplace collaborations, political participation,
and concerning global issues such as climate change, examples of cooperation are man-
ifold, and fostering cooperation has been show to have a number of important applica-
tions [1–10].
Classical studies have been focussed on punishing of defectors [11–14], increasing the
reputation of cooperators [3, 15, 16], and the interplay between these two mechanisms
[17–20]. While these approaches have been successfully shown to enforce cooperation,
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and punishment has been adopted by most countries to sanction defectors, their weak-
ness is their cost to not only the punisher and the punished, but to the third party
tasked with rewarding those with increased reputation. The principle is: if we want to
increase cooperation, someone must pay a cost.
In this light, it becomes important to find less expensive ways to sustain cooperation
and it is here that individual factors may play a crucial role. Assume individual factor X
is known to promote cooperation, then creating an environment which favours factor X
will also promote cooperation. Existence of one or more such factors is suggested by the
numerous experimental studies showing that humans do tend to behave cooperatively,
even in anonymous, isolated environments where communications or long-term strate-
gies are not allowed [21–24]. These studies have shown that humans are heterogeneous:
some may cooperate, while others may not. If so, who are the cooperators?
A growing body of literature is trying to provide answers to this question, by investi-
gating what factors promote cooperation in one-shot social dilemma games, such as the
Public Goods game and the Prisoner’s dilemma. In the Public Goods game, N agents
are endowed with y monetary units and have to decide how much, if any, to contribute
to a public pool. The total amount in the pot is multiplied by a constant and evenly
distributed among all players. So, player i’s payoff is y−xi+α(x1+ . . .+xN ), where xi
denotes i’s contribution and the ‘marginal return’ α is assumed to belong to the open
interval ( 1N , 1). In the Prisoner’s dilemma, two agents can either cooperate or defect.
To cooperate means paying a cost to give a greater benefit to the other player; to defect
means doing nothing.
Previous experimental studies have investigated the role of intuition and altruism on
cooperation (see Box 1 for definitions) in one-shot anonymous Public Goods games and
Prisoner’s dilemma games. Intuitive actions are induced by either exerting time pressure
on subjects or priming them towards intuition versus deliberate reflection [25–28]. While
it is generally accepted that intuition favours cooperation through the Social Heuristics
Hypothesis [25], the correlation between altruism and cooperation is still unclear: one
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study did not find any correlation between altruism and cooperation in a subsequent one-
shot Public Goods game [31], while another study found a positive correlation between
altruism and cooperation in a precedent one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma [24].
Altruism is formally defined as unilaterally paying a cost c ≥ 0 to give a benefit b
to another and is traditionally measured using a Dictator game [24, 27, 29–31]. Here
a dictator is given an endowment x > 0 and must then decide how much, if any, to
donate to a recipient who was given nothing. The recipient has no input in the process
and simply accepts the donation. Givings in the Dictator game are usually considered
as an appropriate measure of altruism [32–35] and recent experiments have shown that
indeed they positively correlate to altruistic acts in real-life situations [36].
Experiments on the Dictator game typically present a bimodal distribution. Participants
tend to either act selfishly or act so as to decrease inequity between players. Consider
the scenario where Player 1 is given $10 dollars and must then decide how much if any
to donate to a second anonymous player. In most cases Player 1 decides to selfishly
keep all of the money, or to donate half to Player 2, and so reduce the inequity between
the two players. There is a third scenario that occurs, although rarely. Here Player 1
decides to donate more to Player 2 than to keep for herself. In some cases players have
been known to donate the entire sum. The act of increasing the other payoff beyond
your own will be called ‘benevolence’. It is likely that this behaviour is not observed
more often in the Dictator game as its design effectively penalises altruism. If cost were
less of a factor perhaps benevolence would be more prevalent.
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Cooperation. Two or more people cooperate if they pay an individual cost to give a
greater benefit to the group.
Altruism. A person acts altruistically if he unilaterally pays a cost c ≥ 0 to increase
the benefit of someone else. More formally, Player 1 is altruist towards Player 2 if he
prefers the allocation (x1 − c, x2 + b) to the allocation (x1, x2), where c ≥ 0 and b > 0.
Benevolence. A person acts benevolently if he unilaterally pays a cost c ≥ 0 to increase
the benefit of someone else beyond one’s own. More formally, Player 1 is benevolent
towards Player 2 if he prefers the allocation (x1 − c, x2 + b) to the allocation (x1, x2),
where c ≥ 0, b > 0, and x2 + b > x1 − c.
In sum, the main difference between cooperation and altruism is that altruism is unilat-
eral: there is no way to get rewarded. Another difference is that we allow altruist action
at negligible cost. In other words, the important part is to create a benefit to someone
else without getting anything back. Benevolence is an extreme form of altruism, where
the final result of the act is that the recipient has a larger payoff of the actor.
Examples of benevolence in everyday life abound. The sharing of one’s food causing the
sharer to go hungry, campaigning on behalf of a VIP in order to promote their agenda,
or something as trivial as ‘liking’ or sharing a status on social networks so as to increase
the reputation of another.
In this paper, we have designed a game that allows players to choose actions that are
malevolent, inequity averse or benevolent, all at minimal cost. More specifically, we give
an endowment L > 0 to Player 1 that she keeps regardless of any subsequent choice.
She has to then decide how much, between 0 and H ≥ L to donate to Player 2. To
donate 0 will be referred as a malevolent act; to donate L will be referred as inequity
aversion; to donate more than L will be referred as benevolence.
This form of benevolence, though costless, increases the inequity among people and so
it is predicted not to exist by the widely used inequity aversion models [41, 42]. Thus,
as a first step of our program, we have conducted an experiment, using this new eco-
nomic game, to show that most people act in a benevolent way even when it is made
clear that there is no possibility of an indirect reward. We next move to investigate
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our main research question: Is benevolence one of those individual factors favouring
cooperative behaviour? With this is mind, as a second step, we have asked whether
benevolence is correlated to cooperative behaviour. We have found that benevolence
positively correlates with cooperation in a number of different settings, and with dif-
ferent payoffs. Finally, in our third study, we have showed the causal link between
benevolence and cooperation: priming people towards benevolence versus malevolence
results in a significant increase of cooperative behaviour.
These results allow us to conclude that benevolence is an individual factor possessed
by many people and that it is among those factors promoting cooperative behaviour.
Although this observation contradicts inequity aversion models, other theories could
be used to explain it. For instance, the tendency to maximise the total welfare and
adherence to social norms can explain the existence of benevolence and its correlation
with cooperative behaviour. We refer the reader to the Discussion section for more
details.
Study 1. benevolence exists.
Inequity aversion models [41, 42] are based on the assumption that humans have a
tendency to mitigate payoff differences. Since benevolence, measured using the game
described below, increases payoff difference between the actor and the recipient, these
models predict that it does not exist. Thus, as a first step of our program, we make us
sure that benevolence does actually exist. Moreover, we test whether people trust in
the benevolence of others and, to this end, we have introduced a second player who has
to gamble on the first player’s level of benevolence. Among the several different ways
one can formalise this strategic situation through an economic game, we have adopted
a particularly simple one, formally described in Box 2.
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BT(L,H). Player 1 is given an amount L ≥ 0 of dollars which she keeps regardless her
choice. She then must choose an amount of dollars between 0 and H ≥ L. Player 2 has
to decide a number between 0 and H, as well. If Player 2’s choice, say t (as in trust),
is smaller than or equal to Player 1’s choice, say b (as in benefit or benevolence), then
Player 2 gets t dollars, otherwise he gets nothing. So player 1’s decision corresponds to
the maximum amount of dollars she allows player 2 to make, while player 2’s choice is
a measure of his trust in Player 1’s benevolence.
We recruited US subjects to play BT($0.10, $1) using the online labour market Amazon
Mechanical Turk [37–40]. After explaining the rules, we asked a series of comprehension
questions to make sure they understood the game. These questions were formulated to
make very clear the duality between harming and favouring the other player at zero cost
for themselves. Players failing any of the comprehension questions were automatically
screened out. We refer the reader to the Supporting Information for full experimental
instructions.
A total of 247 subjects passed all comprehension questions. Among the 123 subjects
who played as Player 1, we find that only 12 participants chose a strategy b ≤ $0.10 (9
malevolent and 3 inequity averse people). All others chose b ≥ $0.40 and about 60%
of the subjects acted in a perfectly benevolent way, choosing b = $1 and so maximising
the inequity between themselves and the others (see Figure 1).
By looking at the 124 subjects who played as Player 2, we find that subjects tended
to trust in the benevolence of others, although we find a general tendency to under-
estimate it: while the average ‘benevolence’ was $0.82, the average ‘trust’ was only
$0.63. The Mann-Whitney test confirms that these samples most likely come from dif-
ferent distributions (P < .0001). We have also conducted a similar experiment with
BT($0.10, $0.10) with 133 US subjects acting as Player 1 and 142 as Player 2. By com-
paring the results in BT($0.10, $1) with those in BT($0.10, $0.10) we find that, after
the obvious rescaling, benevolence and trust do not seem to depend on the maximum
payout H. (Mann-Whitney test: P = 0.538 in case of benevolence; P = 0.981 in case
of trust).
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Figure 1. Distribution of choices in BT($0.10, $1) of those people acting
as Player 1. Only 12 out of 123 participants acted in a malevolent or
inequity averse way; all others acted benevolently with a large majority
of participants acting in a perfectly benevolent way.
Study 2. benevolence is positively correlated with cooperation.
To study correlation between cooperation and benevolence, and cooperation and trust,
we designed a battery of four two-stage games. Participants first played a BT game and
then a standard Prisoner’s dilemma PD(b, c) with cost c = $0.10 and benefit b = $0.25.
In our PD, two players must choose to either either cooperate or defect: to defect means
keeping c, while to cooperate means giving b to the other player. The strategic situation
faced by the participants is summarised in Box 3.
T1. Subjects first play GT($0.10, $0.10) as Player 1 and then play PD($0.25, $0.10).
T2. Subjects first play GT($0.10, $1) as Player 1 and then play PD($0.25, $0.10).
T3. Subjects first play GT($0.10, $0.10) as Player 2 and then play PD($0.25, $0.10).
T4. Subjects first play GT($0.10, $1) as Player 2 and then play PD($0.25, $0.10).
Again we recruited US subjects using AMT and asked qualitative comprehension ques-
tions to make sure they understood the game.
A total of 385 subjects, nearly evenly distributed among the four treatments, passed
all comprehension questions. Figure 2 shows the average benevolence of cooperators
and defectors in T1 and T2. Benevolence seems positively correlated with cooperation
in both treatments. To confirm this, we use logistic regression to predict defection or
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Figure 2. Average level of benevolence of cooperators and defectors in
T1 and T2, with error bars representing the standard error of the mean.
In both treatments benevolence is positively correlated with cooperation.
cooperation as the dependent variable. We find that the correlation between benev-
olence and cooperation is borderline significant in T1 (coeff = 0.175, P = 0.054) and
significant in T2 (coeff = 0.02, P = 0.019). On the other hand, we find that trust affects
cooperation only for H = 0.1 (coeff = 0.167, P = 0.016) and does not for H = 1 (coeff
= −0.001, P = 0.887).
Study 3. Priming benevolence promotes cooperation.
In the previous studies we have shown that benevolence exists and is positively correlated
to cooperation. Here we show the causal link between benevolence and cooperation. To
do this we use an experimental design similar to that used in [25] to show the causal
link between intuition and cooperation: we prime participants towards benevolence or
malevolence before playing a Prisoner’s dilemma. Specifically, we have conducted three
more treatments, as described in Box 4.
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T5. After entering the game, participants see a screen where we define benevolence
as giving a benefit to someone else at negligible cost to themselves. Subjects are then
asked to write a paragraph describing a time when acting benevolently led them in the
right direction and resulted in a positive outcome for them. Alternatively, they could
write a paragraph describing a time when acting malevolently led them in the wrong
direction and resulted in a negative outcome for them. After this, they are asked to
play PD($0.25$, 0.10).
T6. This treatment is very similar to T5, with the only difference that subjects are
primed towards malevolence. We first define malevolence as an unkind act towards
someone else with no immediate benefit for themselves and then we ask participants to
write a paragraph describing a time when acting benevolently led them in the wrong
direction and resulted in a negative outcome for them. Alternatively, they could write
a paragraph describing a time when acting malevolently led them in the right direction
and resulted in a positive outcome for them.
T7. This is a baseline treatment, where participants enter the game and are immediately
asked to play PD($0.25$, 0.10), using literally the same instructions as in T5 and T6,
in order to avoid framing effects.
Also for this study, we recruited US subjects using AMT. In order not to destroy the
priming effect we decided not to ask for comprehension questions before the Prisoner’s
dilemma in T5 and T6. Further, we asked no comprehension questions in T7 so as not
to bias any baseline measurement. To control for good quality results we used other
techniques (see Appendix for full experimental details). In particular, at the end of the
experiment we asked the players to describe the reason of their choice. This, together
with the descriptions of benevolent or malevolent actions, allowed us to manually exclude
from the analysis those subjects who did not take the game seriously or showed a clear
misunderstanding of the rules of the game, as sometimes happens in AMT experiments.
We excluded from our analysis 11 subjects.
300 US subjects, nearly evenly distributed among the three treatments, participated to
our third study and passed our manual screening. As Figure 3 shows, the trend is in the
expected direction. 62% of the participants cooperated in T5, far more than that in T6
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Figure 3. Average cooperation in each of the three treatments. Par-
ticipants primed to act benevolently were significantly more likely to
cooperate than than those primed to act malevolently. The level of
cooperation of unprimed participants lies between those of the primed
groups and cannot be statistically separated from either.
(46%). Pearson’s χ2 test confirms that the difference is statistically significant (χ2(1) =
5.425, P = 0.020). The baseline treatment lies just in between, with a percentage of
cooperation of 58%. However, the difference is not statistically significant with neither
of the other two treatments (T5 vs T7, χ2(1) = 0.394, P = 0.530; T6 vs T7, χ2(1) =
2.629, P = 0.105).
Discussion
Benevolence, that is paying a (potentially zero) cost to increase someone else’s welfare
beyond that of your own, is predicted not to exist by the widely used inequity aversion
models [41, 42], which are indeed founded on the idea that humans have a tendency
to moderate payoff differences. Contrary to this prediction, our Study 1 shows that
most people act in a benevolent way, at least when the cost of the action is zero, and
that most people trust in the benevolence of others. Existence of benevolence might
be seen as surprising also in light of other experimental results showing that people
are often willing to pay a cost to decrease the benefit of a richer partner [43]. The
explanation of these apparently contradictory results most likely relies in social norms:
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most people think that to be benevolent and to restore equity when a situation of
inequity is artificially presented as status quo without any reason as in [43] are both the
‘right things to do’.
Looking for individuals factors promoting cooperative behaviour, we have then asked
whether benevolence is positively correlated with cooperative behaviour. Our Study 2
shows that: benevolent people not only exist, but they are more likely to cooperate in a
subsequent Prisoner’s dilemma. This provides evidence that benevolence is one of those
individual factors favouring cooperation.
Our Study 3 strengthens this conclusion by directly showing a causal link between
benevolence and cooperation. Priming people to think about benevolence in a positive
way or about malevolence in a negative way makes them significantly more cooperative
than priming them to think about benevolence in a negative way or about malevolence in
a positive way. The fact that the level of cooperation can experimentally be manipulated
in such a way connects to the important question of whether priming people towards
benevolence can be used for instance by companies as a way to increase cooperation
among employees or by countries to increase cooperation among citizens, and to what
extent.
As we have mentioned, our results are not consistent with inequity aversion models.
However, a number of other theories could explain both the existence of benevolence
and its positive correlation with cooperative behaviour. Several experimental studies
have shown that many people act so as to maximise the total welfare [44,45] and some
of the most recent mathematical models of human behaviour are indeed based on pos-
tulating this tendency [9, 44, 46, 47]. This predisposition might explain why benevolent
people exist and are more cooperative: our results might be due to a number of people
attempting to maximise the total welfare. Other scholars suggest that social norms
shape most of cooperative behaviour [48, 49]. Though social norms varies across cul-
tures, it is possible that to be benevolent and to be cooperative are both seen as the
‘right things to do’ by part of the US population. From this perspective, our results
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could be driven by a number of people attempting to act according to the social norm
they adhere to.
We conclude by saying that our results do not imply that defectors are never benevo-
lent. As Figure 2 shows, defectors were substantially more benevolent than predicted
by inequity aversion models, but significantly worse than cooperators. Benevolence
thus seems far more transversal than cooperation and suggests the following question.
What evolutionary pressures select for benevolence? Together with the aforementioned
theories, several others, such as warm-glow giving [50] and the Social Heuristics Hy-
pothesis [25], offer qualitative explanations. Andreoni’s warm-glow giving theory states
that (some) humans receive utility from the fact itself of giving; the SHH instead builds
on the idea that everyday life interactions are often repeated and a benevolent act today
may be rewarded tomorrow. It is then possible that people internalise benevolence in
their everyday life and use it as a default strategy in the lab.
In conclusion, we have found that benevolence exists and it is positively correlated
to cooperation. However, the ultimate reason why benevolence exists and why it is
correlated with cooperation is far from being clear. It is therefore an important question
for further research and is likely to be challenging because it clearly connects to some
of the most basic open problems of human social behaviour.
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Materials and Methods
We recruited US subjects using Amazon Mechanical Turk and randomly assigned them
to one of seven experiments using economic games. Treatments are described in the
Main Text and full instructions are given in the Appendix. In four treatments, partici-
pants were informed that comprehension questions would be asked after the instructions
of each game and that they would be automatically eliminated if they failed to correctly
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answer them. Comprehension questions were formulated in such a way to make very
clear the duality between harming and favouring the other player (in case of the BT
game), and between maximising one’s own payoff and maximising the total welfare (in
case of the PD). A total of 385 subjects passed all comprehension questions. Partici-
pants were also informed that computation and payment of the bonuses would be made
at the end of the experiment. So, importantly, in each treatment, participants played
the second game without knowing the outcome of the first. The structure of the re-
maining three treatments was such that we could not ask for comprehension questions.
However, to control for good quality result we used other techniques, such as asking
participants to describe the strategy used. This allowed us to manually eliminate from
the analysis those people who showed a clear misunderstanding of the game rules. No
deception was used. These experiments were approved by the Southampton University
Ethics Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research. For further details of
the experimental methods, see appendix.
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Appendix: Experimental setup
We recruited US subjects using the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) [37–39]. As in classical lab experiments, AMT workers receive a baseline pay-
ment and can earn an additional bonus depending on how they perform in the game.
AMT experiments are easy to implement and cheap to realise, since AMT workers are
paid a substantially smaller amount of money than people participating in physical lab
experiments. Nevertheless, it has been shown that data gathered using AMT agree both
qualitatively and quantitatively with data collected in physical labs [38,39,51,52].
Our experiment was conducted in two sessions. The first session corresponds to Study
1 and Study 2 in the main text, while the second session corresponds to Study 3.
First Session. Subjects were paid a $0.20 show-up fee for participating and then ran-
domly assigned to one of eight treatments.
T1. Subjects first play BT($0.10, $0.10) as Player 1 and then play PD($0.25, $0.10).
T2. Subjects first play BT($0.10, $1) as Player 1 and then play PD($0.25, $0.10).
T3. Subjects first play BT($0.10, $0.10) as Player 2 and then play PD($0.25, $0.10).
T4. Subjects first play BT($0.10, $1) as Player 2 and then play PD($0.25, $0.10).
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Each treatment consists of two economic games. Subjects were informed that compu-
tation and payment of the bonuses would be made at the end of the experiment. So,
in each treatment, participants played the second game without knowing the outcome
of the first. The reason for doing this is that we want to minimise spill over effects due
to the fact that subjects in T1-T4 may behave more or less cooperatively in the second
game depending on whether or not they have been recipient of a benevolent act in the
first game.
A major issue with AMT is that workers try to play multiple times in order to get
a larger bonus and/or play randomly in order to complete the task as soon as they
can. To control for these issues is very easy using the Survey builder Qualtrics. At the
very beginning of the task we asked for the Turk ID and we automatically excluded
from the task people who had already completed it. To address the second issue, we
asked comprehension questions for each of the economic games and we automatically
excluded from the task workers who fail to correctly answer them. We stress the fact
that we decided not to ask technical questions, such as computing the expected payoff
of a strategy profile, and preferred to ask qualitative questions in order to make clear
the dualities between making a benevolent action or not (in the BT game) or between
maximising the total welfare versus maximising one’s own payoff (in the PD).
385 US subjects, nearly evenly distributed among the eight treatments, answered cor-
rectly all comprehension questions.
Here we report the full instructions for Treatment 1. The instructions of the other
treatments were absolutely identical, a part from obvious changes in the parameters.
The first two screens do not contain any information about the game and serve us only
as control to avoid multiple plays from the same subject and lazy participants who can
increase randomness on our data.
Screen 1. In the first screen, participants were welcomed to the game and asked to
type their worker ID. This allows us to automatically exclude workers who have already
completed the task.
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Screen 2. In the second screen, we asked the participant to transcribe a relatively long
neutral piece of text. This allows us as to tell computers and humans apart (CAPTCHA)
and, at the same time, to exclude lazy workers and minimise randomness in our data.
We used a meaningless neutral text in order to avoid framing effects.
In the third screen, people entered the real game. Here is the exact instructions we
used.
Screen 3. Welcome to this HIT. This HIT has two parts. We will tell you about the
second part after you have completed the first one. For your participation in this HIT,
you receive $0.20. You also can earn up to $1.20 as a bonus depending on the group
to which you are assigned. Full details will be given in the following pages. The size
of your bonus depends on the decisions you will make in the tasks that follow but also
on the decisions of another anonymous MTurk participant, with whom you are paired.
Your bonus will be paid within 10 days of the completion of the HIT. You can opt out
at any time although if you choose to exercise this option before completing the HIT
then you will not receive any payment or bonus. You will be told about the outcome
of all parts of the HIT at the same time that your bonus is paid. If you answer any
comprehension question incorrectly the survey will end and unfortunately you will not
receive any payment or bonus. With this in mind, do you wish to continue?
Here participants could either continue or end the survey, clicking on the corresponding
button. Participants who decided to continue were directed to the next screen.
Screen 4. This is the first part of the HIT. You have been paired with another anony-
mous participant, and you now have a decision to make. Your decision will NOT affect
how much money you earn, but it may affect the other participant’s income. Along
with your payment for participating in this HIT you are given 10 additional cents as
a bonus, which you will keep regardless of what follows (congratulations!), the other
participant has been given nothing. You have to choose an amount between 0c and
10c corresponding to the maximum amount of money the other participant can make.
The other participant will try to guess your choice. If the other participant’s guess is
smaller than or equal to the number you have chosen, then they will earn an amount of
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money equal to that guess. Otherwise they will get nothing. The other person is REAL
and will really make a decision. Now we will ask you some questions to make sure you
understand the task. You MUST answer all questions correctly to receive any payment
or bonus. If you answer incorrectly the survey will terminate and you will not receive a
redemption code. There is no incorrect answer when you are asked to make your actual
decision.
(1) Which of the following choices made by YOU favours the OTHER PARTICI-
PANT the most?
(2) Which of the following choices made by YOU minimises the amount the OTHER
PARTICIPANT can win?
In both questions, participants could select all possible integers between 0 and 10, in
T1, or all possible multiples of ten between 0 and 100, in T2. Questions contained a
Skip Logic, that is a program that automatically ends the survey if the answer is not
correct.
Screen 5. Now it’s time to really make your decision. Choose an amount from the
following list.
The list of possible choices in T1 contained all integers between 0 and 10, while in T2
contained all multiples of 10 between 0 and 100.
Screen 6. This is the second part of the HIT. You are paired with another anonymous
participant. The amount of money you earn depends on your choice AND on the choice
of the other participant. You and the other participant are both given 10c and you both
have the same decision to make. You can either keep the 10 cents or give it all to the
other participant who will also receive an extra 5c from us for a total of 15c. So if you
both keep the money, you both earn 10c. If you both give all of your money, you will
both earn 15c. If you keep all of your money and the other participant gives all of their
money, you will earn 25c. If you give all of your money and the other participant keeps
all of theirs, then you will earn nothing. The other person is REAL and will really make
a decision. Now we will ask you some questions to make sure you understand the task.
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You MUST answer all questions CORRECTLY to receive any payment or bonus. If you
answer incorrectly the survey will terminate and you will not receive a redemption code.
There is no incorrect answer when you are asked to make your actual decision.
(1) If the other participant chooses to ‘Keep’, which choice made by YOU maximizes
YOUR bonus?
(2) If the other participant chooses to ‘Give’, which choice by YOU maximizes the
OTHER PARTICIPANT’s bonus?
(3) If you choose to ‘Give’, which choice by the OTHER PARTICIPANT maximizes
the OTHER PARTICIPANT’s bonus?
(4) If you choose to ‘Keep’, which choice by the OTHER PARTICIPANT maximizes
YOUR bonus?
In all questions, participants could select either ‘keep’ or ‘give’. All questions contained
a Skip Logic, that is a program that automatically ends the survey if the answer is not
correct.
Screen 7. Now it’s time to make your decision. What is your choice?
Here participants were asked to either ‘keep’ or ‘give’. No intermediate choices as in [24]
were allowed. Following this screen, we asked demographic questions. A final screen,
providing a completion code to claim for their payment, concluded the survey.
Second Session. Subjects were paid a $0.20 show-up fee for participating and then
randomly assigned to one of three treatments.
T5. After entering the game, participants see a screen where we define benevolence
as giving a benefit to someone else at negligible cost to themselves. Subjects are then
asked to write a paragraph describing a time when acting benevolently led them in the
right direction and resulted in a positive outcome for them. Alternatively, they could
write a paragraph describing a time when acting malevolently led them in the wrong
direction and resulted in a negative outcome for them. After this, they are asked to
play PD($0.25$, 0.10).
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T6. This treatment is very similar to T5, with the only difference that subjects are
primed towards malevolence. We first define malevolence as an unkind act towards
someone else with no immediate benefit for themselves and then we ask participants to
write a paragraph describing a time when acting benevolently led them in the wrong
direction and resulted in a negative outcome for them. Alternatively, they could write
a paragraph describing a time when acting malevolently led them in the right direction
and resulted in a positive outcome for them.
T7. This is a baseline treatment, where participants, after entering the game, are
immediately asked to play PD($0.25$, 0.10), using literally the same instructions as in
T5 and T6, in order to avoid framing effects.
In order not to destroy the priming effect we decided not to ask for comprehension ques-
tions before the Prisoner’s dilemma in T5 and T6. Further, we asked no comprehension
questions in T7 so as not to bias any baseline measurement. To control for good quality
results we asked the players to describe the reason of their choice. This, together with
the descriptions of benevolent or malevolent actions allowed us to manually exclude
from the analysis those subjects who did not take the game seriously or showed a clear
misunderstanding of the rules of the game. We excluded 11 subjects from the analysis.
300 Subjects, nearly evenly distributed among the three treatments, passed our manual
screening. Now we report the exact instructions we used in T5. Those of the other two
treatments were essentially the same, a part from obvious changes. Since the first three
screens were basically the same as the first three screens in the first session, we start
from Screen 4.
Screen 4. Benevolence is defined as giving a benefit to someone else at negligible cost
to yourself. Please write a paragraph describing a time when acting benevolently led
you in the right direction and resulted in a positive outcome for you. Alternatively,
write a paragraph describing a time when acting malevolently led you in the wrong
direction and resulted in a negative outcome for you. Of course, anything you write will
be treated in the strictest confidence.
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Screen 5. Now you are asked to make a decision. You are paired with another anony-
mous worker. You can earn a bonus depending on your and the other participant’s
decision. You and the other participant are both given 10c and you both have the same
decision to make. You can either keep the 10c or give it to the other participant. In
this case we will multiply that amount by 2 and the other participant will earn 20c.
So, if you both keep the money, you will earn 10c each; if you both give all of your
money, you will earn 20c each; if you keep all of your money and the other participant
gives all of their money, you will earn 30c; if you give all of your money and the other
participant keeps all of theirs, then you will earn nothing. The other person is REAL
and will really make a decision.
Screen 6. What is your choice?
Here participants could select to either ‘Give’ or ‘Keep’. No intermediate choices were
allowed. After making their choice, subjects entered the demographic questionnaire.
One of the questions was to describe the reason of their choice.
